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Introduction
The Imagined Futures research project, coordinated with two of my col-
leagues (Wanda Strauven at the University of Amsterdam, and Michael 
Wedel at the University of Film and Television, Potsdam), concerns itself 
with the conditions, dynamics and consequences of rapid media transfer 
and transformation. “Media” in our case refers in principle to all imaging 
techniques and sound technologies, but cinema has provided the conceptual 
starting point and primary historical focus. While changes in basic technol-
ogy, public perception and artistic practice in sound and image media may 
often evolve over long historical cycles, our main working assumption is that 
there are also factors, not of steady and gradual process, but moments when 
transfer occurs in discontinuous, unevenly distributed fashion, during much 
shorter periods of time, and with mutually interdependent determinations.
Imagined Futures initially identified two such relatively abrupt periods of 
transformation taking place across a broad spectrum of media technologies 
and social developments: the period between the 1870s and 1900, and the 
period between 1970 and 2000. The f irst witnessed the popularization of 
photography, the emergence of cinema, the international, transatlantic 
use of the telegraph and the domestic use of the telephone, the invention 
of radio and of the theories as well as the basic technology of television. 
The second period saw the consolidation of video as a popular storage 
medium and avant-garde artistic practice, the rise of installation art and its 
hybridization with cinema, the universal adoption of the personal computer, 
the change from analogue to digital sound and image, the invention of the 
mobile phone and the emergence of the Internet and the world wide web.
A key characteristic of such periods of rapid media change is the volatil-
ity, unpredictability and contradictory nature of the dynamics between 
these technologies’ practical implications (such as industrial uses and the 
resulting potential for economic prof it), their perception by the popular 
imagination (in the form of narratives of anxiety, of utopia, dystopia and 
fantasy) and the mixed response (eager adoption or stiff resistance) from 
artists, writers and intellectuals. These shifting configurations among dif-
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ferent agents offer a rich f ield of investigation for cultural analysis, posing 
methodological challenges and requiring specif ic case studies.
As far as the earlier period is concerned, our research has identif ied a 
number of iconic f igures and their historical contexts: Filippo Tommaso 
Marinetti and Italian Futurism (Marinetti and Marconi: speed; radio and 
the wireless; cinema as the “destroyer” of art and of the museum; cinema, 
war and aviation as major agents of modernization);1 Oskar Messter and 
the three S/M practices of early German cinema (the chief promoter of a 
f ilm industry in Germany since the 1910s, as well as the f irst systematic 
proponent of what I have elsewhere called the three S/M practices of the 
cinematic dispositive2 – science and medicine, surveillance and the 
military, sensor and monitor – all of which play their part in the formation 
of early German cinema, obliging us to recast what we consider to be its 
particular identity);3 and Eadweard Muybridge versus Etienne-Jules Marey: 
photography in motion versus the visualization of data, a project where we 
compare Muybridge, who initially devoted himself to the art-historical 
issue of how to represent movement in the still image, and Marey, who was 
one of the f irst scientif ic photographers to capture, record, measure and 
represent living phenomena and processes (i.e. biological, atmospheric, 
geological) in real time, graphically as well as iconographically, with the 
aid of the cinematic dispositive.4
Finally, our overall project is driven by another consideration: we see nei-
ther the need nor the wisdom of making the history of the cinema begin in 
1895 and end a hundred years later with the dominance of the digital image. 
In other words, we do not endorse the much-discussed “death of cinema,” 
which assumes the break between photographic and post-photographic 
cinema to be fundamental. No more than in earlier times, when such breaks 
1 See Wanda Strauven, Marinetti e il cinema: tra attrazione e sperimentazione (Udine: Cam-
panotto, 2006).
2 Thomas Elsaesser, “Digital Cinema and the Apparatus: Archaeologies, Epistemologies, 
Ontologies,” in Cinema and Technology: Cultures, Theories, Practices, Marc Furstenau, Bruce 
Bennett and Adrian Mackenzie, eds. (London: Palgrave, 2008) 226-40; and Wanda Strauven, 
“S/M,” in Mind the Screen, J.Kooijman, P. Pisters and W. Strauven, eds. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2008) 276-87.
3 The German cinema of the silent period is usually identif ied with Expressionism and fantasy 
subjects. For a revision of this perception, see Kino der Kaiserzeit, Thomas Elsaesser and Michael 
Wedel, eds. (Munich: edition text + kritik, 2002); and Michael Wedel, Der deutsche Musikfilm 
Archäologie eines Genres 1914 – 1945 (Munich: edition text + kritik, 2007).
4 Thomas Elsaesser, “Kontingenz und Handlungsmacht,” in Unmenge - Wie verteilt sich 
Handlungsmacht? Ilka Becker, Michael Cuntz and Astrid Kusser, eds. (Munich: Fink, 2008) 
157-90.
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were posited (several such deaths of cinema have been foretold) – notably 
with the coming of sound, the emergence of television or the invention of 
the video-cassette – do we believe that a new technology introduced in one 
specif ic area (of what is always a constellation of overlapping, mutually 
amplifying but also interfering dispositives) is the cause of radical change 
by itself. Insofar as such ruptures (in technology or cultural practice) do 
occur, we believe that they are also welcome opportunities to revise one’s 
habitual ways of thinking and to test one’s implicit assumptions.5
To give conceptual muscle and a body of empirical evidence to our 
particular perspective, we are engaged in three kinds of “revisionism.” The 
f irst we call “media-archaeology,” which entails a re-investigation into the 
“origins” of the cinema and the cultural context of so-called pre-cinema, 
while also pushing for a history of the discourses generated by the different 
debates around the cinematic dispositive.
The second revisionism is of a more theoretical and conceptual kind. 
Re-reading key thinkers on the cinema, such as André Bazin and Siegfried 
Kracauer, but also Hugo Münsterberg, Béla Balázs and Rudolf Arnheim, 
Sergei Eisenstein and Jean Epstein, we attempt to recover a more compre-
hensive view of the cinema – whether based on notions of Gesamtkunstwerk 
or “anti-art,” on cinematic anthropomorphism or animation; whether com-
mitted to formalism and abstraction, or to an aesthetics genuinely belonging 
in the ephemeral, the instant, the contingent and the multiple (elaborating 
on Baudelaire’s “riot of details” as well as on Walter Benjamin’s “optical 
unconscious”). In short, our second revisionism re-maps the semantic f ield 
of relevant concepts as well as methods in our discipline. Evidently, we 
can only conduct such a review in the light of the present, which is to say, 
mindful of the media environment of the twenty-f irst century.6 Thus, the 
reading of the “classics” is complemented by similarly “holistic” or crisis/
emergency-driven attempts at reading the cinema from within the digital 
domain by contemporary scholars such as Friedrich Kittler, Lev Manovich, 
David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Sean Cubitt, Mary Ann Doane, Jeffrey 
Sconce, Garrett Stewart and others.
Classic texts, as we know, have to be re-read: they have to be put in 
dialogue with contemporary practices and re-assessed in a wider conceptual 
5 For an extended argument, see Thomas Elsaesser, “Early Film History and Multi-Media: 
An Archaeology of Possible Futures?” in New Media, Old Media: A History and Theory Reader, 
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Tom Keenan, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2005) 13-26. 
6 One of the results has been a new approach to (classical and modern) f ilm theory. See 
Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener, Film Theory: An Introduction through the Senses (New 
York: Routledge, 2010).
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network. This bi-focal perspective on the cultural mesh of cinema around 
1900 and 2000 is what we are collectively proposing to elaborate. Hence 
the suitably open title Imagined Futures, which includes the “history of 
imagined futures in the past,” and the “rewriting of the past in light of the 
future.” Even as we refrain from identifying “the future” with the “digital 
era” as such, we think that the inclusion of sound and telephony or the 
extension of the corpus to scientif ic and non-f ictional f ilms, for instance, 
signif icantly enlarges our understanding of “what is cinema.” Likewise, our 
special attention to how the cinema has affected the perception of time and 
the experience of place and space will allow us to redefine the cinematic 
dispositive without being either reductive or all-inclusive.
The third revisionism concerns the application, appropriation and 
implementation of cinematic techniques, technologies and ways of see-
ing in f ields other than the mainstream of f ilm. While alternatives to the 
narrative feature f ilm usually see themselves in terms of antagonism, 
critique and resistance, our revisionism is less interested in addressing 
the division between high culture and popular culture (the ideological-
polemical thrust of postmodernism) or the split between arts and hard 
sciences (the “two cultures” of C. P. Snow). Instead we focus on breaking 
down the division between an avant-garde at the margins or in opposition, 
and the technological-industrial mainstream. What we are trying to explore 
is how sound and image media and other information technologies have 
contributed to or even spearheaded changes in the relation between an 
artistic practice said to be hostile to any kind of application or transfer to the 
realm of industry, commerce and functional use, and an industrial practice, 
supposedly concerned merely with mass-production and maximizing profit. 
Whether we call it “design and advertising,” “post-Fordism” or “research and 
development,” the twenty-f irst century has seen a shift or even a reversal 
in the balance of power between an entrepreneurial avant-garde and an 
avant-garde entrepreneurism. The parallels between avant-garde art and 
industrial application are often surprisingly evident and direct, just as 
the marketing skills of artists and curators easily bear comparison with 
those of industrial conglomerates and commercial companies. We would 
be arguing – on the basis of the episteme 1900 – that the cinema needs to be 
understood in its double role in this respect. It emerged at a time of crisis for 
the self-understanding of the f irst industrial revolution, where the spectacle 
of moving images was meant to mediate between technology, education 
and entertainment. Such a division had not existed during the ascendancy 
of the bourgeoisie earlier in the nineteenth century and may no longer exist 
today. Indeed, one way of understanding the rapid rise of the cinema would 
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be to highlight the role it played as both symptom (of the division between 
education about the world and entertainment extracted from the world) 
and cure (in that it seemed to heal the breach between work and leisure), 
a role also played by the large world fairs in London (1851), Chicago (1893), 
Paris (1889, 1900) and St. Louis (1904), which sought to reconcile the split 
between industry, technology, the public sphere and everyday life.
Thus, our third revisionism tries to track a trend that, from the 1970s 
onwards, has seen these divisions between high-tech, entertainment and 
information – but also between the avant-garde and the mainstream – as 
increasingly blurred and merging, “returning” us to the period prior to the 
1890s. Although we have not yet fully conceptualized the dynamics and 
forces that are bringing style, design, advertising, technological break-
throughs, avant-garde and the mass market together, we note that the result 
is infotainment, advertising-driven education, design following technology 
and “theory” becoming design.
To the extent that we are concerned with often counter-intuitive as-
sociations, heterogeneous networks and non-convergent connections, we 
are sympathetic to the idea of re-investigating the concept of “dispositif.” Its 
capacity to think in terms of bricolage and assemblages, its renewed regard 
for the conditions of reception (envisaging “agents” with different roles and 
functions) and its interest in new pedigrees and genealogies all reaff irm 
the concept’s value and uses. For instance, the proposal to draw upon gene-
alogies that can “distinguish between successive mechanical and military 
paradigms and theatrical, libidinal models” 7 would seem to be quite close 
to our aims as well. It is by attending to non-technological factors, drawing 
connections between agents, sites and practices usually not associated with 
each other, that the more recent term dispositive, central to this volume, 
opens up valuable discursive space, by identifying common denominators 
between and across media. However, “dispositif” – if merely translated as 
cinematic apparatus in British or American English – is less useful to our 
research, since it fails to account fully for what we think is the complexity 
of the present situation. The same goes for the historical period preceding 
“the cinema”: only if we think of “dispositif” as neither synonymous with 
the technological apparatus nor analogous to the Freudian psychic Apparat, 
and retain Jean Louis Baudry’s distinction between “appareil de base” and 
“dispositif,” with the latter signifying different kinds of assemblages and 
arrangements, can we adequately understand the nature of the interac-
7 François Albera and Maria Tortajada, call for papers, conference on “Viewing and Listening 
Dispositives,” Université de Lausanne, Switzerland, May 29-31, 2008.
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tions, the degrees of antagonism and the kinds of interdependencies we 
are tracking for the period around 1900.
The Dispositive Cinema: Conditions of Possibility
In what follows I want to stress one of the main lessons to retain from the 
history of “apparatus theory,” the name by which the discussions around the 
“dispositif cinéma” have come to be known in Anglo-American criticism. 
Rather than repeating the well-known definitions8 and subsequent polem-
ics9 surrounding this particular ocular-centric arrangement of screen, 
projector and spectator, we need a more comprehensive understanding of 
the complex interactions that bring different media together into relations 
of interdependence, competition and complementarity, as they appear 
to us in the twenty-f irst century. Therefore it cannot be our purpose to 
conf ine ourselves primarily to a given (audio-visual) technology and 
construct around it a new “dispositif” without also elaborating a coher-
ent and historically sound model for grasping their mutually interacting 
dynamics. Put differently: it is clearly desirable to have a better account of 
what constitutes the character and historical specif icity of the “dispositif 
cinéma,” “dispositif photographie,” “dispositif vidéo,” “dispositif télévision,” 
“dispositif téléphone.” At the same time, however – and mindful of the 
phrase that “technology is the name for stuff that doesn’t yet work” – one 
should remember that the study of a “dispositif,” theorized around a basic 
technology, cannot by itself specify its cultural impact and consequences. 
Rather, media technologies tend to be culturally most productive where, 
besides their performativity, their disruptive and failure-prone dimensions 
are also taken into consideration. Borrowing from systems theory, one 
might argue with Niklas Luhmann that an “irritant” (Störfaktor) can act as 
stabilizing or energizing element in a given system.10 Hence the attention 
paid in Imagined Futures to dystopias, anxieties and panics as cultural 
indicators of media change.
If we want to understand the place of cinema in the digital environment 
today – as just such an irritant, stabilizing force and counter-practice – 
8 Representative collections in English are The Cinematic Apparatus, Teresa de Lauretis and 
Stephen Heath, eds. (London: Macmillan; New York: St Martin’s, 1980) and Narrative, Apparatus, 
Ideology: A Film Theory Reader, ed. Philip Rosen (New York: Columbia UP, 1986).
9 For a useful summary of the polemics, see Richard Allen, Projecting Illusion: Film Spectator-
ship and the Impression of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997).
10 Niklas Luhmann, Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1990).
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amidst the expanded f ield of the media interaction typical of the episteme 
2000 (and retrospectively also making a good case for the episteme 1900), 
then we need to study the constitutive parts of the classic “dispositifs” 
in their separate developments, as well as identify their analogues or 
functional equivalents across a range of media technologies and practices. 
With this in mind, we have been undertaking separate studies of the “ar-
chaeology of the camera,” the “archaeology of the screen and frame,” the 
“archaeology of projection and transparency,” the “archaeology of motion 
and stillness,” the “archaeology of sound and color,” and so forth. Such stud-
ies are the methodological consequences of speaking of media “transfer” 
or media “change” in the context of what I have termed a Medienverbund, 
that is, a tactical alliance of media practices: not a “transfer” or “change” 
of the properties of one medium into another, be it photographic, video 
or digital, nor the assumption that these are historically successive modes 
of production, be they hand-crafted, mechanical, electronic, replacing 
each other in a trajectory of linear progress.11 Rather, what the idea of a 
Medienverbund requires is the ability to bring to the debate a different level 
of generality or abstraction, on the strength of which fresh comparisons 
can be made and new genealogies generated. Lev Manovich has done this 
in his book The Language of New Media (2001); Edward Branigan has tried 
to do it in Projecting a Camera (2006), as has Sean Cubitt in The Cinema 
Effect (2005). None of them use the word “dispositif,” but their efforts (just 
as ours in Amsterdam, around the archaeologies of screen, projection, 
camera, frame) are consonant with re-situating “apparatus theory,” still 
valuable and an indispensable reference point, not least because it was the 
f irst attempt at a comprehensive theoretical-philosophical articulation of 
the cinema.
In the same spirit, the Imagined Futures project has as its working as-
sumption the notion that a viewing and listening dispositive is predicated 
on several dimensions, working together: it implies a spatial extension, it 
involves a temporal register and it has a subjective reference as historically 
variable but conceptually indispensable elements. Our approach specif ies 
that a dispositive is a dispositive only when it entails a – material – medium 
(most often a combination of technologies), an image (a representation, 
including a sound representation) and a spectator (liable to be solicited, 
11 Thomas Elsaesser, “Archives and Archaeologies: The Place of Non-Fiction Film in Contem-
porary Media,” in Films that Work: Cinematic Means and Industrial Ends, Vinzenz Hediger and 
Patrick Vonderau, eds. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009) 19-34.
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subjectif ied, addressed or affectively and cognitively engaged).12 Such a 
conception of the dispositive echoes, for instance, the def inition proposed 
by Hans Belting. Arguing from the perspective of a post-art history, Belting 
advocates “a new approach to iconology” as part of his image-anthropology: 
“[…] W.J.T. Mitchell [uses] the terms image, text, ideology. […] I also use a 
triad of terms in which […] image remains but now is framed by the terms 
medium and body.” Belting goes on to explain that images can only be 
understood if one takes account of other, non-iconic determinants, and that 
medium needs to be understood “in the sense of the agent by which images 
are transmitted, while body means either the performing or the perceiving 
body on which images depend no less than on their respective media.”13
These attempts at re-description across the humanities underline the 
variable nature of what is to be understood by “image,” “medium” and “the 
moving image” today. What f ilm studies can contribute are conceptual 
precisions and historical clarif ications. For instance, in Belting’s definition, 
the term “framed” seems to me a problematic metaphor in two respects: it 
brings back the picture frame, and thus the picture, as opposed to the image; 
and it is a static-geometrical term, when what is required is a term that can 
encompass processual and time-based phenomena that are in flux. A similar 
caveat applies to the term “dispositif”: it seems to imply a f ixed assemblage 
rather than a dynamic, ongoing process of re-alignment and interaction. On 
the other hand, Belting’s def inition of the body as both “performing” and 
“perceiving” is helpful in that it is also clearly in line with major trends in 
f ilm studies, where “agency” is now applied to characters within the f iction, 
to spectators/viewers/users, but also to objects and machines.14
This brings me to another general point: the debate about the cin-
ematic apparatus, with its emphasis on subject position as a consequence 
of miscognition and disavowal, seems (negatively) predicated on a notion 
of the cinema as ideally a source of secure knowledge about the world. 
When theorists ask “how we know what we know” in the cinema – or, 
to quote Christian Metz’s famous words, want “to understand how f ilms 
12 Each of these terms refers to a different theoretical paradigm: “subjectif ied” belongs to the 
psychoanalytic terminology of miscognition or disavowal; “addressed” recalls Marxist cultural 
studies, via interpellation and negotiation; while “affectively and cognitively engaged” comes 
from studies of narrative comprehension and cognitivist f ilm theory.
13 Hans Belting, “Image, Medium, Body. A New Approach to Iconology,” Critical Inquiry 31.2 
(Winter 2005): 302-19, 302.
14 Discussions around “agency” seem to point to the influence of Bruno Latour, Reassembling 
the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005).
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are understood”15 – are they not committing themselves too exclusively 
to an epistemological theory of f ilm centered on “realism,” even as they 
denounce its realism as an ideological effect? By extension, some of the 
diff iculties and deadlocks – not only of apparatus theory in the 1980s but 
also of f ilm theory at its present conjuncture (where cognitivists are ranged 
on one side, Deleuzians and phenomenologists on the other, united only 
in their rejection of psychoanalysis and semiotics) – might be due in part 
to an insuff iciently articulated debate as to the status of cinema between 
“ontology” and “epistemology.” Cognitivism tends to assume a positive 
relationship between representation, knowledge and truth, depending on 
pre-formed expectations, evidence and ocular verif ication. By contrast, 
psycho-semiotics subscribes to such an epistemology mainly in its negative 
mode, critiquing f ilms for failing to live up to this presumption of realism: 
the very term “illusionism” requires a faith in “realism” as its foil, as does the 
charge that f ilm produces its “effects of the real” through fetishism. Feminist 
theory equates scoptophilia with epistemophilia, attacking both, while 
in the discourse of social constructivism and cultural studies, epistemic 
pretensions of f ilms capable of speaking the truth are no less f irmly and 
no less negatively implied (for instance, when accusing Hollywood of mis-
representations, stereotyping, etc.). A tendency towards cinephobia, in other 
words, underpins a radical epistemic critique of cinema, largely ignoring 
both the aesthetic value that “mere appearance” or the so-called “illusion 
of presence” might have, and the possibility, put forward by Deleuze and 
others, that in the cinema we do not so much gain knowledge about the 
world, as we learn about ourselves being in the world (which would amount 
to an “ontological” position).
Dispositive Mark 1: What Was Cinema
The problem, here, is perhaps a broader one, namely the need to reflect 
once more quite fundamentally about what is cinema/what was cinema, 
and to try and locate its place or purpose within human history in general 
and the history of what is called “modernity” in particular. My sugges-
tion is that we should, for the sake of clarif ication, differentiate between 
anthropological, philosophical and aesthetic theories of the cinema, if we 
are to f ind a level of generality where dispositives are not def ined solely 
15 Christian Metz, “Problems of Denotation in the Fiction Film,” in Film Language, trans. 
Michael Taylor (New York: Oxford UP, 1974) 145.
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by their basic technology. Evidently these are not mutually exclusive ap-
proaches. Anthropological theories, for instance, comprise a wide range of 
views, including André Bazin’s ideas about the cinema as photographically 
based, and of photography being related to the bodily imprint: hence his 
references to mummies, the Turin shroud, plaster casts and other forms of 
eff igies. But it also encompasses Walter Benjamin’s ideas about cinema and 
modernity, his influential concept of the optical unconscious and his notion 
that cinema “trains” the senses, in order for us to cope with the shocks 
and traumata of modern urban life. Also under a broadly anthropological 
perspective, one can count the implications drawn from Foucault’s theories 
of the disciplinary and self-monitoring effects of vision machines, notably 
his theory of the Panopticon, which has been revived – around surveillance 
– as a generalized paradigm of vision in the twenty-f irst century, replacing 
both window and mirror as the “epistemes” of the twentieth century.
The epistemological theories already alluded to would fall under the more 
generally philosophical approaches to the cinema. Film philosophy ranges 
from phenomenological theories to cognitivist ones and also includes various 
ontologies of the cinema (as attributed to Bazin, as proclaimed by Stanley 
Cavell or as imputed to Gilles Deleuze), while the third general category 
would be aesthetic theories of the cinema, whether these call themselves 
“poetics” and are derived from Aristotelian theories of drama, or “formalist” 
as influenced by Russian semiotics, whether they stem from “theatricality” as 
first defined by Plato, or more specifically have to do with Romantic theories 
of play, of appearance and presence, and concern themselves with the status 
of the image in the arts or with the representation of movement and motion.16
In most theories of the cinema proposed over the past eighty years or so, 
there is an overlap between epistemological and aesthetic categories, as in 
the different theories of realism, or in the different ideological critiques, 
where epistemological questions and anthropological concerns are not eas-
ily kept apart. Likewise, ontological theories tend to overlap with aesthetic 
ones, as do phenomenological ones. But the advantage of making such 
distinctions at all is that they encourage another look at existing theories 
16 The publications alluded to here are André Bazin, “Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 
What is Cinema? vol. I, ed. Hugh Gray (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) 9-16; Stanley 
Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1971); Gilles Deleuze, Cinema I. The Movement Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985) and Cinema II. The Time Image, 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989); 
David Bordwell, Narration and the Fiction Film (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); 
and Sam Weber, Theatricality as Medium (Fordham: Fordham University Press, 2004).
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in light of present concerns, notably the media change we are concerned 
with here. Past theories can be productively studied for how they formulate 
the problems, even if one does not agree with their answers.
The question “what was cinema,” formulated across these distinctions 
between anthropological, philosophical and aesthetic “regimes,” would 
determine the agenda for our second type of revisionism, one that re-reads 
the history of f ilm theory. An example of how such a revision might work 
involves André Bazin, one of the undisputed founders of our discipline. 
Bazin has been chided as a misguided epistemologist of realism, when an-
other look at his writings suggests a) that he was the most inter-disciplinary 
thinker imaginable; b) that his anthropological conception of cinema is 
still pertinent, since it even allows for a “cinema after cinema”; and c) that 
there are quite different ways of understanding what he meant by “realism.” 
Re-reading Bazin in 2008, on the f iftieth anniversary of his death, I could 
f ind little that would indict him as a naïve realist, and much that showed 
him to be a sophisticated advocate of illusionism – not only as a matter of 
aesthetics, but also as a matter of belief and mutually negotiated rules of 
the game – rather than as a dogmatic idealist.17
In short, the current state of theory leaves a number of unresolved issues, 
which complicates a historically grounded and theoretically consistent ap-
proach to the “episteme 1900” and its contemporary analogue, the “episteme 
2000.” The very idea of “episteme” evidently implies a broadly Foucauldian 
approach: “the machine (its technology), its location and the place given 
to the spectator/hearer form in this way a three-unit structure.”18 In such a 
formulation, the dispositive is associated with power, “and especially with 
the coercive, disciplinary or controlling power of libidinal assemblages.” On 
the other hand, this idea of a contact space or contact zone between human 
perceptual faculties and mechanical elements may lead one to opt, not for 
“dispositive,” but instead for the term “interface,” understood as a boundary 
across which different systems meet, act on, interfere or communicate with 
one another.19
As indicated, ontological theories have also been revived in order to 
overcome what is now seen as the historicity of the technology that formed 
17 Thomas Elsaesser, “A Bazinian Half-Century,” Opening Bazin, ed. Dudley Andrew, with 
Hervé Joubert-Laurencin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) 3-12.
18 François Albera and Maria Tortajada, call for papers, conference on “Viewing and Listening 
Dispositives.”
19 See for instance Lev Manovich, “Cinema as a Cultural Interface,” http://www.manovich.
net/TEXT/cinema-cultural.html (last accessed on February 4, 2013) and Seung-hoon Jeong, 
Cinematic Interfaces: Film Theory After New Media (New York: Routledge, 2013).
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the basis of the cinematic dispositive in its classical articulation: namely, the 
photographic image, projection and the f ixed spectator. Accommodating 
its importance without being limited by the specif icity of the dispositive, 
such an ontological approach places greater emphasis on “belief” or “trust” 
rather than on “knowledge” or “truth.” Such trust in the “image” (as a f ield 
of forces and intensities, rather than a “representation” with a particular 
“reference”) is secured either as an existential choice or as an interpersonal, 
pragmatic value, and does not depend on a particular “essence” of cinema 
or on photographic indexicality in explaining what binds the f ilm spectator 
to the world (of images).
Recent work in aesthetics has challenged the ocular-centric geometry of 
the cinematic dispositive on several fronts, as part of yet another critique of 
perspectival projection, with “infinity” as the implied vanishing point and 
the “singular source” or solitary observer as the necessary point of view.20 
Other objections concern the fact that the cinematic “cone of vision” privi-
leges space and stasis (“staging in depth”) over time and process; that it relies 
too much on the bounded frame (off-screen/on-screen) or on the centrifugal 
frame (in cinema) versus the centripetal (picture) frame (in painting); that it 
assumes as a given the upright, frontal orientation of human vision and the 
image, and that it tends to “freeze” the individual frame, thus reducing the 
cinematic image to the still image, mechanically animated, rather than start 
from the moving image, temporarily stilled in the photograph. The “new art 
history,” in particular, turned to cinema as a vital element of visual culture in 
the late 1980s.21 In the 1990s, however, overtly Marxist and/or psychoanalytic 
epistemological critiques of apparatus theory began to give way to ideas 
about vision and the observer that revived the multi-perspectival theories 
of the different avant-gardes, while also acknowledging the influence of 
video and installation art and the general opening up of museum culture 
to include the moving image. In the process, the “archaeological” interest 
in early cinema gained new traction and topical relevance: its dispositive – 
once considered “primitive” because it focused more on performance and 
less on narrative – could now be understood as a kind of “deconstruction” 
of monocular perspective, as if a return to the origins of cinema would be 
20 Among the many critiques of the “Albertian window” applied to the cinema, see Victor 
Burgin, “Geometry and Abjection,” Public 1 (Winter 1988): 12-30; and Anne Friedberg, The Virtual 
Window: From Alberti to Microsoft (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).
21 Norman Bryson, “The Gaze in the Expanded Field,” Vision and Visuality, ed. Hal Foster 
(Seattle: Bay Press, 1988) 87-113.
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a case of reculer pour mieux sauter, of stepping back for a new leap forward, 
towards cinema and the moving image in the twenty-f irst century.
Dispositive Mark 2: Early Cinema
The turn/return to early cinema has proved fertile in many different ways. 
Besides documenting the enormous variety of entertainment and scientif ic 
uses of the Cinématographe in the urban environment of evolving modernity 
(the anthropological aspect) and identifying a different aesthetics, whether 
called a “primitive mode of representation” (Burch) or “the cinema of attrac-
tions” (Gunning and Gaudreault),22 early cinema studies also recovered an 
epistemological dimension that tended to be lost in the negative epistemol-
ogy of the 1970s: the close alliance of chronophotography with the empirical 
and observational sciences. As already noted, pioneers like Jules Janssen, 
Etienne-Jules Marey and even the Lumière Brothers (who from 1902 onwards 
devoted their best energies to experiments with color, with echographic 
topology and with medical appliances for war veterans) have returned as 
important f igures in a genealogy of new media and expanded cinema. In 
France, a belatedly recognized hero has emerged in Georges Demenÿ, who 
dreamed up, explored and tested many applications of the moving image 
for sports training, teaching lip-reading to the deaf and more generally for 
educational, military and medical uses. In Britain, the multi-talent of R.W. 
Paul is beginning to be recognized,23 and in Germany, it was Oskar Messter 
who received special attention from scholars working on documentary and 
non-f iction f ilm, but also on more adventurous aspects of the dispositive 
such as sound-image synchronization, color and 3-D projection.24 Messter 
holds a special place in our project and his extensive oeuvre allowed me 
to speak of the S/M practices of the apparatus, meaning: the scientif ic and 
medical imaging dispositive (his work for hospitals touched upon by Lisa 
22 See the essays by Burch, Gunning and Gaudreault in Early Cinema: Space Frame Narrative, 
ed. Thomas Elsaesser (London: British Film Institute, 1990) and a new contextualization of these 
positions in The Cinema of Attractions Reloaded, ed. Wanda Strauven (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2007).
23 See Ian Christie, sleeve notes, biography and f ilmography in R.W. Paul, The Collected Films 
1895-1908 (London: BFI DVD Edition, 2006).
24 Oskar Messter, Erfinder und Geschäftsmann, ed. Martin Loiperdinger, KINtop 3, special issue 
(Basel: Stroemfeld/Roter Stern, 1994).
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Cartwright),25 the surveillance and military dispositive (linking Messter 
to Paul Virilio’s War and Cinema),26 the sensory-motor-schema dispositive 
(showing him to be a contemporary of Henri Bergson), and the sensoring 
and monitoring dispositive (pioneered, besides Marey, by Albert Londe and 
documented, among others, by Siegfried Zielinski27).
In other words, by going back to early and pre-cinema, and duly noting 
the non-entertainment uses of the cinematic apparatus, one can advance 
the proposition that “the cinema has many histories, only some of which 
belong to the movies.”28 Evidently, at least in part, it is the topicality of the 
non- or para-entertainment uses at the turn of the twenty-first century that 
has once more given prominence to these earlier applications of the moving 
image and the cinematograph. While the historical and theoretical studies 
of Virilio and Friedrich Kittler helped to make the connections between 
war and cinema much more present in our minds, this new awareness was 
helped by the daily news bulletins about smart bombs during the f irst 
Iraq War, which in turn found their resonance in Harun Farocki’s work. 
For three decades, his f ilms and video installations have been examining 
the different genealogies of what he calls “operational images” from the 
late nineteenth century, when photography was used for measuring the 
elevation of buildings, through gathering reconnaissance footage from 
spotter planes during WWII, all the way to the use of surveillance cameras 
in Californian prisons and the data-gathering sensors in Berlin supermar-
kets. Farocki’s investigations of hand, eye and machine are exemplary in 
showing how the cinematic dispositive – especially in its observational, 
monitoring and controlling functions – has become a pervasive presence 
in our everyday lives, joining art and entertainment with the industrial and 
bureaucratic uses of the moving image.29 In this sense, Farocki is returning 
to Muybridge’s time-and-motion studies, to which his own researches into 
social routines, stress tests and service-industry training exercises provide 
a contemporary update.30
25 Lisa Cartwright, Screening the Body: Tracing Medicine’s Visual Culture (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
26 Paul Virilio, War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception (London: Verso, 1989).
27 Siegfried Zielinski, Audiovisions: Cinema and Television as Entr’actes in History (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 1999).
28 Harun Farocki – Working on the Sight-Lines, ed. Thomas Elsaesser (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2004) 17.
29 Harun Farocki, Auge/Maschine (video-installation, 23 mn, 2000) http://www.farocki-f ilm.
de/augem1.htm (last accessed on February 4, 2013).
30 See Harun Farocki, Reconnaître et poursuivre (Paris: Théâtre Typographique, 2002).
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New media theorists, on the other hand, have benefited from another 
look at Marey, whose work can now be re-appreciated as part of the archae-
ology of data-visualization and pattern recognition, which is beginning to 
get close consideration not just in the analysis of surveillance footage, but 
also among film scholars and theorists of the articulations of cinematic time 
and the management of real-time data.31 Imagined Futures has a number of 
projects that investigate time and temporality in relation to mainstream 
cinema and installation art, as well as looking at the locative aspects of 
f ilm history and the archive.32 One of my own attempts at an epistemo-
anthropological analysis is an essay on so-called “Rube” f ilms (or Uncle Josh 
f ilms), arguing that earlier views of the phenomenon might have missed a 
crucial aspect, a double layer of reflexivity and agency. Uncle Josh f ilms – in 
which a simpleton mistakes the representation on the screen for physically 
present objects and people and personally intervenes in the action, only to 
destroy the spectacle – pose several questions to the modern viewer.33 Are 
they intended, as is often claimed, to be didactic parables, teaching a rural 
or immigrant audience how not to behave in the cinema, by putting up to 
ridicule someone like themselves? Yet it is doubtful that there ever existed 
such an audience, or a moment of “infancy” and simplicity in the history of 
the movies, where such an ontological confusion with regard to objects and 
persons might have occurred. To me, then, these f ilms imply a meta-level of 
self-reference, in order to explore, not the epistemic conundrum of reality 
versus representation or truth versus f iction, but the anthropological one, 
namely of how to “discipline” an audience through comedy and laughter. 
Do the Rube f ilms not teach their audience how not to use their bodies as 
spectators by allowing them to enjoy their own superior form of spectator-
ship, even if that superiority is achieved at the price of self-censorship and 
self-restraint? The audience laughs at a simpleton and village idiot, thereby 
flattering itself with a self-image of urban sophistication. The punishment 
meted out to Uncle Josh by the projectionist is both allegorized as the reverse 
side of cinematic pleasure (watch out, “behind” the screen lies the f igure of 
the “master”) and internalized as self-control: in the cinema – as elsewhere 
31 Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001).
32 Among the various projects of the Imagined Futures group, see especially Jennifer Steet-
skamp, “Specters of Lessing: The Time-Spaces of the Moving Image Installation,” doctoral diss., 
University of Amsterdam, 2012; Pepita Hesselberth, “Chronoscopy: Affective Encounters with 
Cinematic Temporalities,” doctoral diss., University of Amsterdam, 2012.
33 Thomas Elsaesser, “Discipline through Diegesis: The Rube Film between ‘Attractions’ and 
‘Narrative Integration,’ ” in Strauven, The Cinema of Attractions Reloaded 205-26.
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in the modern world of display of commodities, and the self-display of 
bodies – the rule is “you may look, but don’t touch.”34
Adding a further twist, one can argue that the f igure of the Rube has 
returned, and re-appears in our contemporary media-world, this time as 
the incarnation of the visitor/user, not in the cinema, but in the gallery 
space and also on the net, in the latter case learning how to be an “avatar” 
or to behave as a “fan,” a “nerd” or an “activist.”35 The same ambivalence 
applies to the museum, where visitors no longer know how to respond 
when confronted with, say, video installation art. Under the regime of 
“relational aesthetics,”36 the visitor’s role is destabilized by works that 
are like an enigmatic appliance or a gadget, but lacking the instruction 
manual: they invite participation, or require a special mental act for their 
comprehension or completion, while giving little or no overt clue about how 
they “want to be understood.” The “epistemological” aspect seems like a lure 
or tease, an invitation to a more ludic form of engagement, but on the other 
hand, it implies a reflexive turn that is epistemic in intent. In fact, there is 
now a general uncertainty about what role to play as spectators in the art 
world, just as there is in the media world of television and video-games: are 
we “witnesses” or “bystanders,” “players” or “users,” “observers” or “dupes” 
(Rubes), inadvertently delivering “data” to machine archives? My “return 
of the Rube” would thus be a specif ic or “situated” instance of the more 
general (and generally productive) problematic category of “agency” which, 
as André Gaudreault has pointed out, should be understood to comprise 
both agitant and agité in early cinema.37
Yet this shift from the “old” Cartesian subject-object divisions to some-
thing closer to an actor-network theory does not altogether resolve the 
question of the spectator’s emotional investments, so central to apparatus 
theory, but also to any appreciation of the aesthetics of cinema. If scholars 
are now more cautious about speaking of “mis-cognition” and “disavowal” as 
the features typical of cinematic subjectivity, there are still good arguments 
34 See Wanda Strauven, “Re-Disciplining the Audience: Godard’s Rube-Carabinier,” Cinephilia: 
Movies, Love and Memory, Marijke de Valck and Malte Hagener, eds. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2005) 125-33; and Wanda Strauven, “Touch, Don’t Look,” I cinque sensi del 
cinema/The Five Senses of Cinema, Alice Autelitano et al., eds. (Udine: Forum, 2005) 283-91.
35 Thomas Elsaesser, “Archaeologies of Interactivity: Early Cinema, Narrative and Spectator-
ship,” Film 1900: Technology, Perception, Culture, K. Kreimeier and A. Ligensa, eds. (Luton: John 
Libbey, 2009) 9-21.
36 The term “relational aesthetics” was made famous by Nicolas Bourriaud. See his Relational 
Aesthetics (1998; Paris: Les Presses du Réel, 2002).
37 See also the preface by François Albéra in Alain Boillat, Du Bonimenteur À La Voix-Over - 
Voix-Attraction et Voix-Narration Au Cinéma (Lausanne: Antipodes, 2007).
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for characterizing the cinema as a dispositif for subjectif ication. This is 
not so much because of the particular spatial arrangement (projection), 
but thanks to the cinema’s temporal dimension, marked by “delay” and 
”interval” in the sense of re-inscribing duration into the cinematic experi-
ence (the time image, energy, modulation, in Deleuzian language; “entropy,” 
“intermittence” in the language of cybernetics). This also makes it possible 
to distinguish cinema from “real-time” electronic media on the basis of 
“delay” and “deferral,” i.e. on the basis of a phenomenological distinction (if 
we take these terms in their Derridean sense) rather than a technological 
one (as the difference between photographic and electronic images). We 
thus would have to add “time” to “agency” in order to build up a model of a 
dispositive that does not privilege a particular technology and still proves 
relevant to both photographic and non-photographic moving images.
Dispositive Mark 3: Installation Art and the Moving Image
Temporality and time economies, in particular, raise a further dimen-
sion in our consideration of the dispositive, which conveniently leads us 
to re-investigate the aesthetic theories of the cinema, albeit in only one, 
admittedly prominent, manifestation: that of the “entry” of the cinema and 
the moving image onto the scene of contemporary art, where the cinema 
now seems to have a permanent place, however ambiguous a place it may 
appear in practice.
One of the most signif icant phenomena in the history of the “dispositive 
cinema” is the way the moving image has taken over and has been taken 
over by the museum and gallery spaces. From the mid-1990s onward, major 
shows in London, Los Angeles, Paris, Oxford, New York, Vienna and other 
cities aff irmed the museums’ intention to “represent” the cinema and 
claim it as “art.”38 Despite the success of such exhibitions, matters are not 
straightforward when the moving image enters the museum. Different 
actor-agents, power relations and policy agendas, different competences, 
egos and sensibilities, different elements of the complex puzzle that is the 
contemporary art world and its commercial counterpart inevitably come 
38 Some of the landmark exhibitions were “Spellbound” (Hayward Gallery, London, 1995), “Art 
and Cinema since 1945: Hall of Mirrors” (Moca, Los Angeles, 1996), “Notorious – Alfred Hitchcock 
and Contemporary Art” (Museum of Modern Art, Oxford, 1999), “Hitchcock et l’art: coïncidences 
fatales” (Montreal/Paris, 2000/2001), “Into the Light: The Projected Image in American Art, 
1964 – 1977” (Whitney Museum, 2001), “X-Screen – Filmic Installations from the 1960s and 70s” 
(MuMoK, Vienna, 2004). 
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into play. However easy it might be to project a f ilm inside a gallery with 
just a few mobile walls and lots of dark fabric, the museum is no cinema and 
the cinema no museum: mainly because of the different time economies 
already alluded to, which oblige the viewer in the museum to “sample” a 
f ilm, rather than make it the occasion for “two hours at the movies.” Time 
is thus one of the reasons why cinema and museum constitute two quite 
distinct, and in the past often mutually exclusive, dispositives.
The fact that cinema and the gallery space are, both historically and philo-
sophically, two antagonistic visual arrangements and spatial dispositives is 
usually expressed in the juxtaposition of “black box” and “white cube.” Each 
space is culturally pre-determined, has its own historically conditioned but 
deeply ingrained traditions, and follows particular architectonics, ordering 
principles or “logics” which amount to distinct ontologies. As we saw, the 
classical (or “black box”) cinematic dispositive requires a unique layout and 
geometry, in the way that screen-space, auditorium space and projector 
are aligned in relation to one another for the “cinema-effect” to occur. The 
museum/gallery (or “white box”) is itself a specif ic dispositive. With its 
white walls, its preference for “natural” light and its emphasis on smooth 
surfaces, it organizes space in such a way that the objects visible to the 
spectator are brought close and maintain their distance at the same time. 
The placing and hanging of pictures subtly privileges the upright, forward 
orientation of our gaze, directed at the formation of an “picture,” distinctly 
framed and positioned at eye-level. Still paying tribute to the “open window” 
of Renaissance perspective, the white wall into which the image space 
is cut allows for generous margins and empty surfaces to surround each 
picture, while the heavily gilded frames are a reminder of the fundamental 
difference between the picture, what it contains, the look it retains and 
the space that surrounds it. In the museum, there is never any off-screen 
space, to speak in the language of cinema: the classical oil painting is wholly 
contained – self-contained, indeed – within the frame, while cinema lives 
from the tension between off-screen and on-screen, what the frame delimits 
and what it creates a passage for. As I already pointed out, it was André 
Bazin who famously distinguished the “centrifugal” cinema frame from 
the “centripetal” painting frame.39
The difference between these vectors helps explain why the gallery and 
the cinema are distinguished by the mode of attention they afford their 
respective viewers. The kind of presence produced by standing in front of 
39 André Bazin, “Painting and Cinema” [1959], What Is Cinema? vol. 1, trans. Hugh Gray 
(Berkeley: University of California Press 1967) 164-69.
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a work of art in a museum or a gallery carries very strong indices of time 
and place (of a “now” and a “here”), which in turn imply a special type 
of viewing subject, highly aware of itself and its surroundings and thus 
receptive to reflection, introspection and auto-reflection. Walter Benjamin 
famously called this presence “aura” and was careful to specify its conditions 
of possibility, along with the slippages the aura undergoes in the age of 
mechanically reproducible images and the commodity form. Speculating on 
the mode of presence typical of the cinema, Benjamin speaks of the desire to 
touch and the simultaneous barring of this desire, generating the cycles of 
disavowal and fetish-formation which psychoanalytic f ilm theory famously 
identif ied, albeit via a different route of analysis. Simplifying a little, one 
could say that the museum produces a particular kind of presence (a “me,” 
a “here” and a “now”), whereas the cinema produces a split self-presence of 
multiple temporalities (a “me/not me” in an endlessly deferred “here/not 
here” and “now/not now”): Roland Barthes, in his several essays devoted 
to photography and the cinema, highlighted some of these differences in 
terms of tense.40
In their distinctive logics, the dispositives “cinema” and “museum” entail 
a further set of differential coordinates, which come into play or conflict 
when the moving image enters the museum: a f ixed image and a mobile 
spectator (museum) have to be aligned with a moving image and a f ixed 
spectator (cinema). From what has been said about the cinematic apparatus, 
the combination of the moving image and the mobile spectator drastically 
redefines, if not destroys the “cinema-effect,” while for the contemplative-
reflexive spectator of the picture gallery, the moving image is a distraction 
and an irritation. Painting and sculpture are about the representation of 
movement, not its instantiation. The encounter of cinema and museum thus 
obliges even art history to rethink the place and role of the viewer in front 
of an artwork, as well as examine the kinds of self-enclosure or “exposure” 
afforded to the moving image not just by the physical display (the monitor 
or screen), but also by the manner in which the look of the image frames 
the viewer’s gaze in the gallery’s surroundings.41 The new configuration of 
cinema/museum also affects what Belting calls “the body,” i.e. the respective 
degrees of embodiment of the “spectator” and the “visitor.” Compared to the 
40 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida. Reflections on Photography (1981) and Roland Barthes by 
Roland Barthes (1977), trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010).
41 One may recall the famous scene in Hitchcock’s Vertigo, where Scotty watches – in the sense 
of “spying on” – “Carlotta”/Judy looking at – in the sense of “contemplating” – the painting of 
her “ancestor.”
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cinema’s originally disembodied look, the gallery’s default value is always 
embodied perception, aware as we are of our surroundings and other bodies. 
Also part of “the body” are the different relations of size, scale and detail in 
the museum and on the cinema screen. A further disruption or transgres-
sion is implied by the entry of sound and sound-spaces into the museum, 
traditionally a site of silence and stillness (in both senses of the word). In 
other words, there are some fundamental antinomies between cinema and 
museum that require serious consideration by both f ilm scholars and art 
historians.
Dispositive Mark 4: Encounter and Event
Yet the salient argument to make here is that these apparent incompat-
ibilities (and the many contradictory relations that obtain between the 
respective dispositives) are precisely among the theoretically most fruitful 
and in practice most productive factors about the f ine arts and visual cul-
ture today, not only enabling but necessitating the new kinds of encounter 
alluded to, as moving image and museum enter into sustained and no doubt 
permanent contact and alliance with each other. For is it not the case that 
these starkly distinct dispositives are themselves “on the move” and in flux, 
each in its own way undergoing internal transformation, and for reasons 
that at f irst glance do not seem to be interconnected or mutually dependent? 
Take as one example the upright forward orientation, the prevalence of the 
wall, the rectangle cut out like a window: modern art, at least since the 
1950s, has subverted or ignored this arrangement with artists like Jackson 
Pollock, Carl Andre, Andy Warhol, Joseph Beuys and many others. In very 
different ways, these artists have made the f loor, rather than the wall, 
the site of display, not least because it challenges the canonical model of 
bodily-perceptual orientation and thus creates a new “moment” of art: a 
challenge only very gradually taken up by the cinema.
More drastic, but also more banal (because they are so often commented 
upon) are the changes that the cinematic dispositive has undergone: tel-
evision long ago subverted it, merely by substituting the small screen for 
the movie theater and phosphoric glow for projection, provoking in turn 
different kinds of re-assertions of the power of the projected image, whether 
through Cinemascope (in the 1950s) or the Dolby surround-sound design 
(in the 1970s). Since then, screens have become both bigger and smaller, 
but above all, they have become more “mobile”: in their proliferation as 
monitors on every table top, in the home and at work, in their locations 
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(such as urban screens, electronic notice-boards, airplanes, motor-cars or 
public transport) but also embedded in the hand-held devices we carry on 
our bodies, such as music players or mobile phones. This means that the 
opposition between “collective reception” in ranked and regimented seating 
(cinema) and “individual absorption” in a state of solitary contemplation 
(museum) is no longer valid, at least not in any absolute way. Meanwhile, 
and notably for the blockbuster shows that international museums habitu-
ally organize, the throng of massed visitors makes the solitary study of 
individual works a thing of the past or of another era, as more and more let 
their eyes be guided by portable “audio-tours.”
The black box and the white cube are thus, strictly speaking, no longer 
either an oppositional or a complementary pair: we are, as it were, in the 
“grey room.” Their similarities and differences come into play at another 
level of generality that exceeds both types of dispositive, generating new 
sets of parameters and taxonomies. What, for instance, is the status of 
projection, now that the moving image is mostly digital, and illumination 
means something quite different? In what sense can we still speak of a light 
cone and “scopic vision” (cinema) versus diffused light and “ambient vision” 
(museum)? A cinephile may regard projection as the def ining feature of 
cinema and logically conclude that without projection, there is “no more 
cinema.” Or one might decide that the litmus test, as it were, of “what is 
cinema” lies with luminosity, achieved through transparency, and not with 
illumination as a layering effect. In either case, one would have to seriously 
revisit familiar genealogies: traditionally, a (tenuous) line of continuity 
could be drawn from the light-sensitive silver salts of photography to the 
electrons hitting the cathode ray tube, and from the vertical scan-lines of 
a television set to the pixel-grid of the digital image – in the sense that in 
each case, a surface is impacted by light, leaving the particular arrange-
ment of traces or the pattern of particles that we call an image. At the 
same time, a radical break is posited between photographic index and 
digital code. Yet arguably, at least as fundamental a break occurred in the 
switch from luminosity through transparency (which still photography 
and cinema have in common) to luminosity through refraction, opacity 
and saturation. In this respect, the “opacity” of the digital pixel is closer to 
the opacity of pigment in painting than either is to photography, leading 
to the many – admittedly also deceiving – painterly metaphors used to 
describe or advertise computer-generated image-processing software, or 
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to the “slippages” between the media of photography and painting in the 
work of an artist like Jeff Wall.42
Contrasting the dispositive of installation art with that of the cinema on 
the basis of these precise but diverse parameters presents several further 
advantages: f irst of all, it de-emphasizes technological determinism (the 
technological f ix which I see as so problematic in the theories that posit a 
radical break between photographic and digital cinema), allowing instead 
for very different technologies and materials to achieve similar effects 
and experiences. Secondly, it de-centers the “performing and perceiving” 
subject (Belting), thus redirecting our thinking toward the relations that 
exist in the realm of images – between humans and things, humans and 
plants, humans and machines, machines and machines, all considered as 
agents (the reverse side and complement of the famous anthropomorphism 
discussed by the avant-garde under the heading of photogénie or celebrated 
in the “science is f iction” f ilms of Jean Painlevé and others).
Perhaps most crucially, however, an installation – especially one involv-
ing the moving image – has a particular relation to time and temporality, in 
the sense that many such installations introduce a structural non-alignment 
between their own temporality and that of the spectator’s time economy 
of the gallery visit, producing (as suggested above) typical effects of “sub-
jectif ication”: the anxiety of missing the crucial moment, the potential 
conflict between curiosity and boredom when confronted with a video, 
signaling a duration ranging anywhere from three minutes to three hours. 
In this non-alignment, the encounter of viewer and installation acts as 
both a continuation and a critique of the cinematic dispositive, not only 
in the way that installations can deviate from the frontal orientation and 
Renaissance perspective already discussed, but also in the manner they 
subvert the temporal regime of both the cinema (where I know in advance 
that I commit a substantial portion of my time, and where narrative maps 
the order of succession and closure) and the art gallery (where the amount of 
time I choose to spend in front of a painting or sculpture is my own decision, 
unstructured, and not in any way pre-given by the work).
The (video-)installation, by contrast, suspends me: I wait for the pro-
verbial shoe to drop, for the unique moment of rupture, I attach myself 
to or fantasize para-narrative elements; I experience a conf iguration of 
time-space, which puts me in a different relation to self-perception and 
body-awareness – no longer the kairos or chronos of linear narrative, but 
42 See, for instance, Sven Lütticken, “The Story of Art According to Jeff Wall,” in Sven Lütticken, 
Secret Publicity: Essays on Contemporary Art (Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 2005) 69-82.
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an un-pulsed time of “too much” and “not enough.” Elements that appear 
to my eyes as contiguous in space may have to be read as successive in 
time, or vice versa: their succession has to be retroactively reconstructed 
as spatially distinct. In any case, there is no longer a “norm” by which to 
measure the deviations, the extremes or the excesses, while any sense of 
the work’s overall shape and extension necessarily escapes me, forcing a 
radical reconsideration of the relation between fragment and totality so 
crucial to Western aesthetics, but also to the cinema (“montage”/editing), 
and challenging any notion of spatial capture or closure, even as the black 
box mimics the darkened movie theater. Yet in some ways this anxiety of the 
“too much/not enough” of installation art, turned into an aesthetic effect, 
is reminiscent of one of the panic discourses in early cinema, when movie 
theaters switched from short programs to full-length features, with doctors 
warning about eyestrain, physiological damage and nervous disorders that 
might result from watching a continuous action on screen for more than 
a few minutes.
Conclusion: the Dispositive as Interface?
The detour via the museum and installation art has been necessary in 
order to explain – including to myself – where I think the term “dispositif” 
might be problematic, and where it offers scope for clarifying the situation 
we f ind ourselves in, the episteme 2000, when compared to the episteme 
1900. With the emphasis now on parameters such as temporality, dura-
tion, process, “relationality,” contact, mobility, event and encounter, the 
traditional def initions (and translations) of “dispositif,” even without the 
question of “technology,” become problematic because they are too f ixed 
spatially (beholden to Euclidian geometry) and too vague epistemologi-
cally (what is the status of f ilm as semiotic object, if time intervenes and 
bridges the binary pair absence/presence?). Furthermore, the “dispositif” 
thus conceived still keeps the “subject” in a disciplinary-libidinal double 
bind (the “subject effect” of fetishism and disavowal, as theorized by Lacan, 
being replaced by the “subject effect” of power, knowledge, discourse, as 
analyzed by Foucault).
What might nonetheless make it worth adopting the term dispositive is 
its semantic flexibility and metaphoric openness (compared to “apparatus”). 
If I am right in thinking that, besides being def ined by “image,” “medium,” 
and “body” (Belting) and “the machine, its location and the place given to 
the spectator/hearer” (Albera/Tortajada), the cinema today should also be 
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regarded as an “event and encounter, taking place” (my definition, intended 
to both supersede and contain the idea of f ilms as “works” and “texts”), a 
term (or set of terms) is needed that can establish a viable conjunction 
between the variables “agency,” “time,” “space”/“place.” Can dispositive 
connote this, while still covering these other meanings?
In The Language of New Media, Lev Manovich puts forward the term 
“interface” to designate this meta-space, i.e. the different kinds of contact 
zones, spatial relations or visual surfaces that cinema audiences have in 
common with computer users and their interaction with the software, 
but also for the kinds of encounters between object, space, duration and 
beholder that I have sketched as “taking place” in the museum. Manovich 
sees the cinema as an important set of references for the new media environ-
ment, what he calls “the cinema as cultural interface”:
despite frequent pronouncements that cinema is dead, it is actually on 
its own way to becoming a general purpose cultural interface, a set of 
techniques and tools which can be used to interact with any cultural data. 
[…] “Cinema” [here] includes mobile camera, representation of space, 
editing techniques, narrative conventions, activity of a spectator – in 
short, different elements of cinematic perception, language and recep-
tion. Their presence is not limited to the twentieth-century institution 
of f iction f ilms, they can already be found in panoramas, magic lantern 
slides, theatre and other nineteenth-century cultural forms.43
Manovich’s eminently pragmatic approach tries to give some historical 
depth as well as breadth of applicability to “interface.” Yet where “dispositif” 
(as “apparatus”) seemed overly restrictive, “interface” looks unduly capa-
cious. If, like myself, one travels in the opposite direction and comes to 
contemporary media practice from the study of cinema, one of the questions 
that concern me is: under what circumstances or conditions (cultural-
historical, technological-industrial or aesthetic-formal) is it conceivable 
that the moving image no longer requires as its main medium the particular 
form of time/space/agency we know as “narrative” (perhaps the most “viable 
conjunction” of these variables so far developed), while still managing to 
establish a coherent “world,” which is to say, turn an “event” (a singular 
time/space occurrence) into an “encounter” (addressing a spectator in his/
her here-and-now)? Is a time/space continuum possible that is differently 
43 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001) 86. See also http://
www.manovich.net/TEXT/cinema-cultural.html (last accessed on February 4, 2013).
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organized, yet still accommodates the “body” and gives the impression of 
“virtual presence”? What forms of indexicality (material link, pointer) or 
iconicity (mimesis, resemblance) are available, for combinations of sounds 
and images to credibly mark a “here” and “now,” while also relating them 
to a “me”?
In other words, I am looking for a term that captures this “here-now-me” 
as the variable “grounding” of my cinematic experience. Whether I watch a 
Hollywood blockbuster on my iPod or see a mere f ive minutes of Douglas 
Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho in a gallery, I can call either a “cinematic” encounter 
and event, not because of questions of LCD-screen vs. projection, digital 
vs. photographic image, black box vs. white cube, f ilm vs. video, optical vs. 
haptic, fragment vs. totality; but because in each case, I can specify that 
the relation of a “here,” a “now” and a “me” constituted a consistent spatio-
temporal world, whose “rules” I understand and whose effects I experience 
as “presence,” under conditions of assent that I can call “belief” (which, of 
course, includes the “suspension of disbelief” as well as the “as-if” belief 
of the f ictional contract). What is also clear, however, is that with such a 
definition of “dispositif,” I am no longer in the realm of epistemological ques-
tions to put to the cinema. Rather, I am on the road to “(re-)ontologizing” 
the cinema: experiencing it not as a way of knowing the world, or seeking 
to attribute to it a specif ic meaning, but instead, living the cinema as a 
particular way of being-in-the-world, and participating in its disclosure, its 
unfolding, its becoming-present: with all the affects, cognitive dissonances 
or bodily states that this might entail.
If this sounds unexpectedly Deleuzian, I feel bound to point out that 
for me, such a def inition of the “dispositif” actually rests as much on 
media-archaeological foundations as it does on philosophy, and that it 
has its own genealogy and pedigree in early and pre-cinematic practice. 
Suppose we went back to the laterna magica of Athanasius Kircher, as the 
agreed ancestor of cinematic projection. Yet instead of tracing its mode of 
representation via Renaissance perspective to the rigid geometry of the 
cinematic apparatus, where do we arrive at, if we choose an alternative 
route? What if, from the laterna magica, we derived in the f irst instance 
Étienne-Gaspard Robert’s (or Robertson’s) phantasmagoria as the most 
popular, but also conceptually most challenging precursor of cinema? We 
might then f ind ourselves in a position to argue that a direct line runs from 
phantasmagoria to Pepper’s Ghost and other spectral productions of pres-
ence in the nineteenth century to certain genres of cinema, mainly those 
featuring special effects, with horror and fantasy, but not only: the lineage of 
phantasmagoria also initiates a form of cinema that does not project itself as 
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a window on the world, nor requires f ixed boundaries of space like a frame. 
Rather, it functions as an ambient form of spectacle and event, where no 
clear spatial divisions between inside and outside pertain, and where there 
are strong indices of presence, while its temporality reaches into past and 
future (calling up the dead, soothsaying and predicting events yet to come), 
while the senses are anchored and the body situated in a “here and now.” 
As such, phantasmagoria would be the dispositive that also most closely 
approximates the genealogical ancestor of what I described as installation 
art above, one that does not depend on the frame or even on the upright 
forward orientation, one that furthermore takes “sound” into account, but 
also the one whose epistemological effects are, as it were, grounded in an 
aesthetics of appearance as presence, rather than the other way round.
However, the modif ication I am proposing has not one, but two nodes 
in the nineteenth century: besides that of the phantasmagoria, as it comes 
down to us via Robertson’s adaptation of the magic lantern, this cinematic 
dispositive also includes the work of Marey, notably insofar as he pioneered 
the non-human, dare I say “spectral” visualization of data, both photograph-
ing and graphing statistical (mathematical, numeric), optical (visible to 
the machine eye, but too fast or too slow for the human eye) and dynamic 
phenomena (emanating from organisms and sentient beings). I can here 
only hint at this aspect – which might involve reconsidering the Kantian 
“sublime” as a crucial dimension or property of this dispositif. Still, as I said 
at the beginning, Marey remains a key reference point for our project, due 
to its inherently ontological scope. Although his efforts, experiments and 
ambitions would normally be called “epistemological” (aimed at producing 
new knowledge about the world), considered from the standpoint of making 
all emanations of life manifest, Marey’s thinking also introduces a new 
taxonomy of things, of what exists and what does not, of what is visible and 
what is not, and of what is actual and what is virtual – linking him, with 
Bergson, to Gilles Deleuze.
I come to my conclusion. My initial proposition has been that, in order 
to understand what the episteme 1900 and the episteme 2000 have in 
common, we need to overcome the division between photographic and 
post-photographic cinema, and see it, not as a break, but as an occasion 
for revising our previous notion of “what is cinema.” If for some thirty or 
forty years, the answer to “what is cinema” has involved some version of 
the dispositive cinema (such as “cinematic apparatus”), then the task inter 
alia is to redefine this central concept. This is what my essay has attempted 
to do: f irst I reviewed the canonical def inition, as it has been specif ied 
around the particular geometry of representation that Jean-Louis Baudry 
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was the f irst to identify with the parable of Plato’s cave, with Renaissance 
perspective and with the Freudian psychic apparatus. Following references 
to the various critiques of this formation, I proposed and discussed several 
other possible articulations of the dispositive cinema, whose properties 
were more institutional than technological, more time-based than geo-
metrical, more anthropological than ideological and more “ontologizing” 
than epistemological. Starting out from early cinema, making a leisurely 
detour via installation art and the museum and a brief one through digital 
media and interface, I ended up by returning to pre-cinema: the double 
and possibly improbable pedigree of Robertson’s phantasmagoria joined 
to Marey’s chronophotography. The trajectory has provided me with a 
set of parameters and priorities that in my opinion need to inform our 
def inition of the “dispositif,” for which notions of space, time and agency 
(the “here-now-me”), as well as of “belief,” “appearance” and “presence” play 
as great a role as the semiotics of absence and presence, the dynamics of 
voyeurism and disavowal or the notion of “vision-knowledge-power” (voir, 
savoir, pouvoir).
This “perspective correction”44 has led me to posit a further proposition 
or rather, to formulate a challenge, namely that we may have to supplement 
our traditional epistemological interest in the cinema (around “realism,” 
the subject-object split, questions of ideology, illusionism, power) with a 
tentatively ontological view (as well as a renewed aesthetic investigation) of 
the cinema – here called, perhaps somewhat imprecisely, “cinema as event 
and encounter, taking place.” Another way of highlighting the difference 
of emphasis, again in a somewhat rough-and-ready fashion, would be to 
suggest that whereas our Renaissance ocular-centric orientation has infinity 
as its vanishing point (the all-seeing God of the Dollar Bill, or of Bishop 
Berkeley’s esse est percipi: to be is to be seen) and the singular source as 
its point of view, the orientation I am trying to identify has as its salient 
feature, not Euclidean space, but ubiquity. I would def ine ubiquity as the 
felt presence of pure space, whose temporality is neither chronos nor kairos, 
but an “indefinite,” reversible time, and whose ocular counterpart would 
be not be surveillance as sight, knowledge, power, but as the unlocalizable 
experience of sight without an eye and as the human-machine equivalent of 
Nicolas de Cusa’s God: “to be at the centre of the world and yet at every point 
of its circumference,” i.e. the paradox (or mystery) of an un-located situated-
ness. Such ubiquity, in other words, produces its own forms of embodiment 
44 I borrow the phrase “perspective correction” from Rod Stoneman, “Perspective Correction: 
Early Film to the Avant-Garde,” Afterimage 8/9 (Spring 1981): 50-63.
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and agency in response to unrepresentability and to the unlocalizable 
sense of presence. Ubiquity gives imagined vision and sight to non-sentient 
objects, to machines, organisms or “things,” as these enter the realm of the 
visible in seemingly contradictory forms: as eff igies (imprints, moulds, 
installations, photographs) and as apparitions (ghosts, revenants, zombies 
and other post-mortem creatures). Together, the eff igy (as index) and the 
apparition (as presence) constitute elements of a new modality of evidence 
and authenticity, sometimes called “the virtual,” but which I prefer to regard 
as constitutive for all cinema.
The conclusion I would draw, then, is that such a post- or para-epistemo-
logical idea of cinema means accepting, not only the groundless ground of 
cinematic “representation” and its dispositive in the way that Foucault, for 
instance, deconstructed the Renaissance painterly dispositif in Velasquez’s 
Las Meninas. It would require a further step of “renegotiating” belief, ap-
pearance and presence, in the full knowledge that such a “belief in the 
cinema” inherits and accommodates both the hopes and the skepticism 
of the epistemological view, rather than denying or transcending it. A 
cinematic dispositive grounded in “belief” and “presence” is contradic-
tory and counter-intuitive, but it would see time, space and agency as 
the (necessary) relational terms for any form of cinema, whose impure 
and mixed, mechanical and spiritual, material and mental, semiotic and 
mimetic “nature” alienates us from our bodies and senses, takes us away 
from the “here-and-now” – in the very act of constituting possibly their most 
historically potent and in all likelihood most permanent manifestations.
